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Abstract
Female bargaining power in rural Haryana, as in much of northern India, is con-
strained by widespread discrimination against women. In recent years, however, women
successfully demand private sanitation facilities from potential husbands as a precondi-
tion for marriage. I study this manifestation of bargaining power by modeling latrine
adoption as an investment that males can make to improve their desirability on the mar-
riage market, and I show that increasing proportions of females with strong sanitation
preferences drive male investment in toilets. Moreover, I demonstrate women’s ability to
secure latrines increases when they are relatively scarce in a marriage market. I test these
predictions empirically by studying a sanitation program in Haryana, India, known col-
loquially as “No Toilet, No Bride”. Using a triple difference empirical strategy based on
households with and without marriageable boys, in Haryana and comparison states, be-
fore and after program exposure, I provide evidence that male investment in sanitation
increased by 15% due to the program. Further, the program effect is four times larger
in marriage markets where women are scarce (26%) as compared to marriage markets
where women are abundant (6%). These results suggest the relative scarcity of women
in Haryana has, conditional on women surviving to marriageable age, improved the
ability of the remaining women to secure valuable goods.
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1 Introduction
The economic analysis of public goods often focuses on the suboptimal provision that arises
from non-excludability and free-riding. In this framework, costly private efforts to pro-
vide public goods generate unremunerated, external positive benefits, and therefore rational
agents underprovide public goods relative to the social optimum. Implicit in this analysis is
an assumption of unitary decision-makers, whether optimizing individuals or households.
If the public good in question is one that households must choose to provide, however, then
the validity of the unitary decision-making assumption is critical to understanding provi-
sion.
A large and growing body of empirical research casts doubt on the fiction of a unitary
household as a model of intrahousehold behavior.1 A promising alternative for modeling
household decision processes is the collective household model, which assumes only that
households are Pareto efficient (Browning et al. (1994)); individuals within the household
are not assumed, in this approach, to have identical preferences, as in the traditional unitary
household model. The assumption of collective efficiency generates testable predictions of
how “distribution factors” (Browning & Chiappori (1998)), variables that affect the intra-
household allocation without changing preferences, enter individual demand functions.
This focus on intrahousehold decision-making raises a second, potentially important de-
terminant of public good provision. In particular, if agents inside the household have het-
erogeneous preferences for a public good (or, equivalently, in their private costs of provid-
ing that good), then intrahousehold decisions will also affect the provision of certain public
goods. This paper develops this argument by focusing on intrahousehold bargaining over
an impure public good and provides strong evidence that intrahousehold bargaining can be
shape public good provision.
Women in rural Haryana suffer from discrimination that is widespread and strong enough
to generate the most skewed state-level sex ratio in all of India.2 Due to parental preferences
for sons over daughters, parents provide differential post-natal care to boys and girls (Das
Gupta (1987)), invest preferentially in male fetuses (Bharadwaj & Nelson (2010)), and/or
selectively abort female fetuses (Arnold, Kishor & Roy (2002), Qian (2008)). Each of these
factors exacerbates the sex imbalance. Further, if women survive to adulthood, they face nu-
merous gender-specific constraints on their ability to travel or work outside of the household
(Eswaran, Ramaswami & Wadhwa (2009)).
In this social context of discrimination, females in rural Haryana have in recent years
1For recent examples, see Ashraf (2009), Qian (2008), Bobonis (2009), among others.
2Source: Indian Census, 2011. Note that two non-state union territories, Chandigarh and Delhi, both adja-
cent to Haryana, have slightly worse sex ratios.
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demanded from men and obtained a particularly valuable good—toilets—as a precondition
for marriage. Women value toilets to a greater extent than males because they suffer dis-
proportionately from male staring and harassment when they defecate, urinate, or attend to
menstrual hygiene in public places. For this reason, private latrines generate benefits that
are disproportionately enjoyed by females. The change that has allowed women to success-
fully demand latrines in marriage negotiations is associated with an unusual sanitation cam-
paign commonly known as “No Toilet, No Bride", which Haryana state authorities initiated
in 2005. The campaign encouraged families of marriage-age girls to demand that potential
suitors’ families construct a latrine prior to marriage. Mass media messaging via billboards,
posters, and radio advertisements emphasized phrases such as “no toilet, no bride” and “no
loo, no I do”. These messages were framed by women’s concerns about privacy and dig-
nity when they defecate in the open, a behavior that is routine among roughly 70% of rural
households in Haryana in 2004. Although the rationale for public investment in sanitation
programs is the reduction of fecal pollution and the morbidity associated with widespread
open defecation, the emphasis of “No Toilet, No Bride”, combined with the fact that private
benefits accrue largely to women, provides a unique opportunity to study female bargaining
power under widespread discimination.
The “No Toilet, No Bride" program serves as a source of exogenous variation that alters
the distribution of female preferences for sanitation. Because women move into the house
of their husbands or their husbands’ families at the time of marriage, the program’s focus
on women’s preferences indirectly targets male behavior. I study the male response to the
program by modeling latrine adoption in a transferable utility model of the marriage mar-
ket. In the model, men can choose to invest in sanitation in order to raise their returns from
marriage, which also depend on marriage market conditions. The model generates two key
empirical predictions. First, I show that increasing the proportion of women with strong
preferences for sanitation will cause men to increase their investments in latrines. Second, I
extend the model to focus on the role of sex ratios, and I demonstrate the marriage market
return to male investment increases to a greater extent when females are relatively scarce
as compared to when females are abundant. Finally, I analyze the potential role of dowries
in altering these empirical predictions, and I establish that the model’s predictions on male
investment will remain unchanged because dowry is determined in equilibrium as one com-
ponent of the marital surplus.
I test these predictions using two rounds of the District-Level Household and Facility
Survey (2004, 2008/9), a nationally representative, household data set. I employ an empir-
ical strategy based on the intuition that the “No Toilet, No Bride” campaign exerts dispro-
portionate pressure to adopt a latrine on those households with boys active on the marriage
market. If the program was successful in linking sanitation with the marriage market, then
3
households with boys of marriageable age face exogenous pressure to build a latrine, and
they should therefore have a higher probability of latrine ownership after exposure to the
program. Because such households could differ from households without marriageable age
boys in a variety of unobserved ways, my econometric specification controls explicitly for
these unobserved characteristics. I implement a difference-in-difference-in-difference ap-
proach that compares latrine ownership in households with and without boys of marriage-
able age, in Haryana and comparison states from northern India, before the program started
and three to four years after the program began.
I find an increase of 4.3 percentage points (a 15% increase from a base of 28%) in the
latrine ownership differential between households with and without marriage-age boys in
Haryana over the period 2004 to 2008 relative to the difference between latrine ownership
households with and without marriageable boys in comparison states. In addition, I provide
strong, complementary evidence that latrine adoption is driven by whether households have
marriageable boys active in a highly competitive marriage market, i.e. one with an under-
supply of women due to highly skewed sex ratios. Specifically, I find that Haryana’s ob-
served latrine adoption due to “No Toilet, No Bride” is driven largely by marriage markets
with a scarcity of women; in these markets I estimate a program effect of 26% over baseline.
In marriage markets without this scarcity, however, the “No Toilet, No Bride” treatment
effect is one-fourth as large.
These results are robust to competing hypotheses that the program caused changes in
male preferences or increased latrine ownership by changing female preferences outside of
marriage market channels. Evidence against the former hypothesis comes from a test of
program effects among households with boys slightly older than marriage age, and who
were thus too old to be affected by the program when they were active on the marriage
market. Similarly, I present evidence against the latter alternative hypothesis by analyzing
the ability of strictly single marriage-age girls to demand and obtain latrines. Thus, the
program appears to operate specifically through the channel of marriage market bargaining.
Finally, I seek evidence on shifts in the intrahousehold sharing rule due to the “No
Toilet, No Bride” program. Using a range of household assets and marriage-related vari-
ables that women value, I find no evidence the program has caused women to substitute
toilets for other goods they value. On the contrary, women’s relative position appears to
have improved both in terms of age at marriage and the educational quality of their male
spouses, while males appear to have been compensated in the form of motorbikes, perhaps
in compensation for their sanitation expenditures. I am unable to determine empirically the
intrahousehold allocation due to unobservables, but these results provide suggestive evi-
dence that although “No Toilet, No Bride” has altered marital negotiations in various ways,
women’s status has not worsened along multiple observable dimensions.
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Consistent with theoretical predictions from a transferable utility marriage market model
with endogenous investment in quality, these findings suggest that (i) the “No Toilet, No
Bride” campaign has significantly increased latrine ownership by linking marriage match-
ing to the acquisition of a good that females particularly value, and (ii) biased sex ratios have
increased the relative bargaining power of women on the marriage market, thereby improv-
ing their ability to demand goods. Thus, in an area with one of the most severely skewed
sex ratios on earth, a local scarcity of women appears to have increased women’s bargaining
power, allowing them to obtain additional goods that they value.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a social and economic background
to marriage markets in northern India and Haryana, specifically where the “No Toilet, No
Bride” program operates. Section 3 presents a model of marriage matching with endoge-
nous investments in quality; a fuller treatment can be found in the theoretical appendix.
Section 4 discusses sanitation in rural India and important features of the “No Toilet, No
Bride” program. Section 5 explains the empirical strategy, identification issues, and data.
Section 6 contains the key empirical results. Robustness to competing hypotheses is dis-
cussed in Section 6.3, and Section 7 discusses additional evidence on female bargaining and
the intrahousehold allocation. Section 8 concludes.
2 Marriage Markets in Northern India
Marriage markets in northern India are fundamentally shaped by social norms around pa-
trilocality and caste endogamy. Moreover, the marriage negotiation process is structured
by the phenomena of arranged marriage and dowry. Marriages are typically arranged by
the parents of both families, often with the help of an intermediary matchmaker, who helps
identify suitors according to the criteria established by the families. The most important di-
mensions along which potential spouses are valued include caste, religion, kinship, profes-
sion, education, and physical attractiveness; the attractiveness of women is a characteristic
particularly important for men (Banerjee et al. (2009)). Together, these interlocking institu-
tions play a primary role in shaping the opportunity sets faced by marriage-age individuals
and in determining marital outcomes. In this section I provide an overview of these social
practices and highlight those characteristics significant for the theory and empirics of this
paper.
2.1 Patrilocal Exogamy
The first important aspect of marriage in northern India, of which Haryana is a part, is the
practice of patrilocal/virilocal exogamy, i.e. the migration of newlywed brides out of their
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households and into the residence of their husbands’ family located outside of the brides’
home village (Gould (1961)). For example, data from the 1994 PGIRCS survey in the states
of Uttar Pradesh and Karnataka suggest that 90% of imported brides originated from vil-
lages located within 67 kilometers of the sample villages (Bloch, Rao & Desai (2004)). In
their study of how village exogamy serves as a form of insurance against spatially corre-
lated risks, Rosenzweig & Stark (1989) note that the average distance across which two rural
Indian households linked through marriage was approximately 30 kilometers. These em-
pirical findings are broadly consistent with other qualitative evidence such as Dutt, Noble
& Davgun (1981), which details marriage-generated links for two Punjabi villages and finds
that 80% of households had a marriage distance of 40 kilometers. Thus, although households
practice strict village exogamy (and appear to seek villages whose incomes do not covary
strongly with the home village), households are typically searching for partners within a ge-
ographically defined area. This descriptive fact is important for the purposes of this paper
because later I adopt an empirical definition of marriage markets in reference to a house-
hold’s home district.3
2.2 Caste Endogamy
A second, crucial feature of Indian marriage matching is caste endogamy, i.e. the practice of
marrying a spouse from within one’s own caste. For example, Banerjee et al. (2009) cite an
opinion poll in which 74% of respondents from West Bengal define themselves as opposed to
inter-caste marriage, and the authors note the practice of caste endogamy is so widespread
that matrimonial classified advertisements, which are common in Indian newspapers, often
group listings by caste. In addition, these authors present evidence that individuals are will-
ing to trade substantial benefits in terms of spousal beauty, education, and/or wealth in or-
der to marry within-caste. Later in the empirical section of this paper, I use such widespread
and strong preferences for caste endogamy, coupled with the pervasiveness of patrilocal
exogamy described above, to justify my empirical definition of a marriage market.
2.3 Sex Ratios in Contemporary India
In India, particularly in the northern states, the phenomenon of “missing women”, i.e.
women absent from the population due to skewed sex ratios, has a long history. For exam-
ple, under British rule in the 19th century, census officials documented low ratios of women
to men in northern India and British officials suspected the Rajputs, a large northern clan,
of female infanticide (Chakraborty & Kim (2008)). Whereas in the past much of the ob-
3The full definition I use is the intersection of caste, religion, marriage-age cohort, and district.
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served sex imbalance was explained by such infanticide and/or differential neglect of girls
(Das Gupta (1987)), the spread of ultrasound, amniocentesis, and doctor-provided abortion
technology in recent decades has driven sex ratios among younger cohorts.4 Estimates us-
ing data from the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-2, 1998/9) indicate that more than
100,000 sex-selective abortions of female fetuses were being performed each year in India,
many of them by private providers in contravention of (unenforced) government regulations
(Arnold, Kishor & Roy (2002)).
The underlying driver of both differential neglect and selective abortion is a strong parental
preference for sons. Parents prefer boys over girls for each birth order, but this effect in-
creases dramatically for higher birth order children. In data from the District Level and
Household Survey (DLHS 2008/9), 15% of married female respondents without children re-
port wanting a boy but only 3% desire a girl, conditional on wanting another child. For
birth orders higher than four, nearly 10 times more mothers state a preference for another
son as compared to another girl (65% and 6%, respectively). Moreover, these patterns are
dominated by preferences among households in northern Indian states.5
The consequence of these widespread preferences, coupled with abortion technology and
differential neglect/care in the intrahousehold allocation, is a dearth of women relative to
men as compared to sex ratios assumed to be natural in countries without discrimination. In
this broad regional context, the Punjab region stands out as having the most imbalanced sex
ratios. According to the newly released 2011 Census of India, the overall ratio in India is 940
women for every 1000 men. But this aggregate figure masks substantial heterogeneity across
Indian states. For example, the Indian state with the most favorable sex ratio for women is
Kerala with a female-male ratio of 1084; Kerala is followed by Pondicherry and Tamil Nadu
with ratios of 1038 and 995, respectively. The most sex-imbalanced state is Haryana with
only 877 females for every 1000 males. Punjab, which has close historical, cultural, and
economic ties with Haryana, has a sex ratio of 893 females for every 1000 males. These data
are summarized in Figure I, which depicts state-level variation in sex ratios.
Marriage markets are, of course, shaped by the relative proportions of men and women,
and the phenomenon of missing women thus increases competition between men for the
remaining women. Using this empirical context as motivation, I develop in the next section
a conceptual framework for understanding how sex ratios and other marriage market factors
affect human capital investments that make people more desirable.
4Induced abortion has been legal in India since the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act (1971) but only
under specific conditions that exclude preferences over the child’s sex or overall family gender composition.
5The largest discrepancies between stated preferences for sons and daughters were found in Bihar, Chat-
tisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttarakhand, and Uttar
Pradesh. Among households in these states, the average ratio of son to daughter preference was 4.4, condi-
tional on wanting another child. By contrast, among the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Goa, Karnataka,
Kerala, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu the same average was 1.6.
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3 Marriage Matching With Endogenous Investment
The decision to marry is one of the most consequential economic decisions in an individ-
ual’s life. Spouses not only bring qualities to the union that interact to shape household
(re)production, with strong implications for intra- and inter-generational welfare, but spousal
traits structure the matching process by which marriages form in the first instance. These
facets of marriage have occupied a substantial fraction of economists’ attention to the causes
and consequences of marriages. Much of this research has examined how marriage market
conditions and singles’ outside options affect outcomes in marriage, with a common result
emerging that the fiction of a unitary household inadequately characterizes the complexity
of real-world intrahousehold behavior.6
Due to the importance of marriage, individuals surely anticipate their marriage prospects
and, to the extent feasible, make decisions that maximize their gains from that (future) part-
nership. Yet only relatively recently has attention been paid to how marriage market condi-
tions affect pre-marital behavior (Iyigun & Walsh (2007), Chiappori, Iyigun & Weiss (2009)).
Given the widespread importance of traits such as income and education in people’s mari-
tal decisions, premarital behavior in anticipation of marriage will be critical in determining
investments and human capital accumulation. The empirical evidence on these theoretical
predictions is sparse, but Lafortune (2010) finds evidence that variation in sex ratios, and
thus marriage market prospects, affect individuals’ investment decisions in education. Sim-
ilarly, Arunachalam & Naidu (2006) find that expectations over future fertility bargaining
impacts dowry payments before marriage. By showing that men invest in latrines as a re-
sponse to marriage market conditions, this paper contributes to this small literature.
This section outlines a simple, two-period model that describes how marriage market
conditions affect premarital investments. I begin with the benchmark transferable utility
model of the marriage market, incorporate useful simplifications drawn from a study by
Chiappori, Iyigun & Weiss (2009) on educational attainment and marriage matching, and
reinterpret the model to reflect preferences over sanitation. Moreover, I extend the model in
two ways to adapt it to important features of the marriage market context in Haryana, as
6The theoretical literature on collective household and marriage models suggests that marriage market
conditions, such as sex imbalance or divorce laws, should affect the intrahousehold allocation by shifting the
resource sharing rule toward the scarcer sex (e.g. Becker (1973), Angrist (2002), Chiappori, Fortin & Lacroix
(2002). In this sense, sex ratios are a prototypical distribution factor (Browning & Chiappori (1998)), i.e. a con-
dition that alters the household sharing rule without changing the joint budget set or individual preferences.
Evidence for this consistent theoretical result has been found in several developed country contexts. For ex-
ample, Angrist (2002) studies immigrant populations in U.S. labor markets and finds that sex ratios charac-
terized by many men to women results in lower female labor force participation among married women, and
(Abramitzky, Delavande & Vasconcelos (2011)) find supportive evidence that sex imbalance affects the aver-
age gap in quality between men and women. Similarly, Chiappori, Fortin & Lacroix (2002) study changes in
divorce legislation and find that favorable changes in the legal status of women diminish female labor supply.
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discussed in Section 2. First, I devote special attention to the interaction of sex ratios and
the distribution of traits in the population. Second, I make the role of dowries explicit in the
agents’ marriage decisions and I show that investment decisions are unaffected by dowry
amounts. In this section, I provide an intuitive discussion of the main assumptions and I
focus on predictions that I later test empirically; the theoretical appendix contains additional
details.
The conceptual framework is based on a frictionless, transferable utility model of mar-
riage matching, which treats men and women as distinct decision makers with individual
preferences, i.e. (potential) households are not assumed to be unitary. An equivalent inter-
pretation is that the parents of men and women act as decision makers (and parental prefer-
ences are identical to the preferences of their children); this interpretation is arguably more
apt in the context of arranged marriages. Prior to marriage, men choose to invest in their
quality in order to maximize the utility they will receive over their two-period lifetimes. In
the second period, men either marry or remain single. If they marry, the benefits from mar-
riage are shared between spouses in a manner determined by marriage market constraints
as well as the human capital investment decisions made prior to marriage.
The key characteristic of this model is that males and females are divided into only two
classes, high and low, which correspond to gender-specific preferences for sanitation (Chi-
appori, Iyigun & Weiss (2009)). Individual utility for all agents is increasing in sanitation,
but due to the gender-specific cost of entering the high sanitation class, a positive fraction
of men and women have low sanitation class when time begins in the model. All payoffs
for singles and married couples depend only on the sanitation class to which an individual
belongs, i.e. utility is a function only of sanitation class. This implies that the shares of mar-
ital surplus, which are determined in equilibrium, also depend only on sanitation class. In
particular, since all individuals have a perfect substitute, individuals of the same sanitation
class must receive the same share of the marital surplus. In this way, the model assumptions
generate specific bounds on the returns for males of being high or low sanitation class, and
these bounds will be shown to vary with both the fraction of women with high sanitation
preferences and with the sex ratio.
3.1 Basic Features of Transferable Utility
To formalize these arguments, begin by considering the benchmark transferable utility model
in which individuals have exogenously determined index of quality. Let x reflect the quality
of males and y the quality of females. The union of individuals x and y produces marital
output denoted by f (x, y), which is a function only of individual characteristics.7 In this
7In the interest of exposition, I assume heterosexual partnerships for the remainder of this paper.
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paper, as is typical in the literature, this marital production function is assumed to be super-
modular, i.e. male and female traits are complements in production, which implies positive
assortative matching in the marriage market (Becker (1973)).
If individuals do not marry, their utility is simply f (x, 0) for males and f (0, y) for females,
with f (·, ·) assumed to be strictly increasing in both arguments. Given these individual
utilities, we can define the material surplus, i.e. marital output minus singles’ output, as:
zxy = f (x, y)− f (x, 0)− f (0, y) (1)
In addition, men and women have an exogenous, idiosyncratic gain from marriage θi, which
is assumed to be distributed as θi ∼ F(θ) for i = x, y. A natural interpretation for the
parameter θ is in terms of the underlying heterogeneity of the individual, emotional gains
from marriage. Given this emotional gain from marriage, we can write total marital surplus
as equal to zxy + θx + θy.
The defining characteristic of the transferable utility framework is that marital surplus
is divided and shared between spouses. In this way the TU model provides an attractive
interpretation of dowries and brideprices. These payments at the time of marriage help to
clear markets because individuals of lower quality have a well-established mechanism for
providing their (potential) spouse with a larger share of the marital surplus.
3.2 Specific Model Assumptions
The general transferable utility framework can be simplified in an appealing manner in
order to highlight the binary decisions most relevant to premarital investment in sanita-
tion. These simplifications originate from a model presented in Chiappori, Iyigun & Weiss
(2009), who focus on educational investments and marriage matching. The key assumption
is that males and females can be divided into two classes, high and low, which in this context
correspond to gender-specific preferences for sanitation. This assumes that singles’ output
and married people’s output are functions only of sanitation class. Denote these classes by
x ∈ {h, l} for males and y ∈ {h, l} for females (where h and l mean high and low). Finally,
assume that the output functions are such that: (i) singles’ utility is increasing in sanitation
class, i.e. f (h, 0) > f (l, 0) and f (0, h) > f (0, l), and (ii) sanitation classes are complements,
i.e. f (x, y) is supermodular and zhh + zll > zhl + zlh.
Thus, the three key assumptions that characterize this TU set-up are the following: (i)
output/utility depend only on sanitation class, (ii) output is an increasing function of only
sanitation class, and (iii) sanitation classes are complements in the production of marital
output.
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3.3 Grounding Model Assumptions in Empirical Context
Although these assumptions on spousal traits reflects a simplification of the decision-making
process around marriage, they adhere closely to real-world conditions in general, as well as
the particular context of this study. First, note that once an individual is of marriageable age
and marriage inquiries begin, the investment options available to improve one’s quality in
the eyes of potential suitors are extremely constrained. The most important traits for mar-
riage, as discussed in Section 2, are not chosen by individuals active on the marriage market,
but are either (i) assigned to them by birth (caste, religion, kinship), (ii) represent the accu-
mulation of multiple years of human capital investments (education, profession, beauty), or
(iii) are constrained by external factors (profession and labor markets). By contrast, males’
decisions to invest in latrines are endogenously chosen, relatively cheap, and available over
even a very short time scales. In this way this model captures effectively the short-term
investment decisions men can make over latrine construction in order to attract a bride.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that marital output is an increasing function of sani-
tation class, and that sanitation classes are complements in terms of marital output. Owning
a toilet is likely to result in better health outcomes, e.g. reduced illness, and improved non-
material welfare benefits, e.g. dignity and social status. This is true both for singles and for
married couples. Similar arguments justify the assumption of complementarity in sanitation
classes across spouses. Due to health-related externalities, for example, the health benefits
an individual obtains from sanitation will enhance the benefits that individual’s spouse ob-
tains from sanitation. Further, dignity and social standing will increase to a greater extent
not only if a given individual is known as being of high sanitation class but if their spouse is
as well. Thus, there is good reason to believe that sanitation classes of men and women will
be complements in the marital output function.
3.4 Marriage Decisions
Conditional on sanitation class, individuals in the marriage market choose the class of the
potential spouse such that their share of the marital surplus is maximized. If the same con-
ditions are met on the other side of the market, and if males’ and females’ respective shares
are greater than zero, then the marriage forms. Formally,
ux = max{Ux + θx, 0} where Ux = maxy
[
zxy −Vy
]
(2)
vy = max{Vy + θy, 0} where Vy = maxx
[
zxy −Ux
]
(3)
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Individuals choose the partner of a sanitation class that maximizes their share of marital sur-
plus, which is given by Ux (for men) and Vy (for women). Due to the simplification regard-
ing sanitation classes, there are only four possible pairing: high/high, high/low, low/high,
low/low. Further, the set-up implies that all individuals in the same group have an identical
substitute and therefore must receive the same share of marital surplus. In particular, ob-
serve that if Uh is the share of marital surplus obtained by men in the high sanitation class,
and Ul by those in the low sanitation class, then the difference (Uh −Ul) specifies the addi-
tional surplus a married man receives from being in the high as compared to low sanitation
class.
3.5 Endogenous Investment
Let the marriage market economy be comprised of individuals who live for two periods.
In period one, all men are in the low sanitation class, but can choose to invest in sanitation
at cost c, which converts them into a high sanitation class individual in period two. All
investment decisions occur in the first period and all marriage decisions occur in the second
period. Assume lifetime utility is additive across periods. If men never marry and do not
invest, their lifetime two-period utility is given by 2 f (l, 0). If they do invest, then in the first
period they consume the output associated with a low sanitation person, f (l, 0), and in the
second period consume f (h, 0) if they remain single.
The unmarried individual’s return to investing is the difference between individual output
as a high and low sanitation class person:
φx = f (h, 0)− f (l, 0) (4)
Putting this potential single individual’s return together with the marriage market return to
investment, the investment decision rule of males can be written as:
f (h, 0) + f (l, 0) +max [Uh + θx, 0]− c > 2 f (l, 0) +max [Ul + θx, 0] (5)
The left hand side of this inequality gives the total output consumed by men of high sanita-
tion class after investing in period one; the right hand side gives total output conditional on
not investing.
As discussed above, decisions to marry are determined by the agents’ value of θ. In
particular, if the individual emotional gain from marriage is sufficiently small (θx < −Uh),
then even the largest possible share of the marital surplus will be insufficient to entice men
to marry. Similarly, if the draw of θx is larger than −Ul, then the male will always marry,
irrespective of investment decisions. Finally, there is an intermediate range of θx for which
12
men marry on condition that they invested in the first period, and they remain single if they
do not build a latrine (−Uh < θx < −Ul).
3.6 Equilibrium
Equilibrium in this model is established by two criteria. First, a clear prerequisite for any
stable matching profile is that equal numbers of men and women must marry. Formally,
r [1− F(−Vh)] = [1− F(−Ul)] +
∫ −Ul
−Uh
G(φx +Uh + θx)h(θ)dθ (6)
where the left-hand side is simplified due to the assumption that female cost to being of high
sanitation class is sufficiently low as to not impede females developing strong preferences
for toilets.8
The first term on the right-hand side gives the proportion of men for whom the idiosyn-
cratic gain from marriage, θx, is sufficiently large that they always marry. The second term
reflects the proportion of men who marry because they made the premarital investment.
The sum of these two terms must equal the sum of females, given on the left-hand side, who
marry. This quantity is mediated by r, which specifies the sex ratio of females to males. If
r 6= 1, then incentives must adjust in order to equilibrate the numbers of available women
and willing men to marry.
The second criterion for equilibrium characterizes the relative proportions of men and
women in high and low sanitation classes. Even if there are equal populations of men and
women, it could be the case that, in equilibrium, the number of men or women with high
sanitation class differs from the other sex. Therefore, some high sanitation class individuals
must marry a low sanitation class partner (if they marry at all). Because of complementarity
in types, it must be the case that either (i) there are equal numbers of high sanitation men and
women, in which case equilibrium displays perfect positive assortativeness, (ii) some high
sanitation men marry low sanitation women, or (iii) some low sanitation men marry high
sanitation women. Formal characterization of the equilibrium can be found in the appendix.
3.7 Predictions
The equilibrium conditions generate empirically verifiable predictions, which I test in later
sections. In particular, the model delivers two important results on the impact of shifting
8More generally, if there is a cost to females of becoming high sanitation class, then they will face an in-
vestment decision rule similar to 5. Later, when I discuss the “No Toilet, No Bride” campaign, this case can be
modeled as a shock that reduces dramatically the cost of females being high class. For example, if social norms
previously made it rare or difficult to negotiate over latrines, then “No Toilet, No Bride” made is less costly for
women to express their preferences for sanitation.
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women’s preferences on male investment in latrines; these model implications are stated in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Given the transferable utility marriage market with endogenous investment dis-
cussed above:
(i) An increase in the fraction of women with strong preferences for sanitation causes males’ mar-
riage market return to sanitation investment to increase.
(ii) The marriage market return to males’ sanitation investment associated with any given increase
in the proportion of women is larger when women are scarce than with equal populations; this
return is smallest when women outnumber men.
Proof. See Section A.3 in the appendix.
Intuitively, as the proportion of women with high sanitation class increases so that there
are more high sanitation class women than men, then men obtain their largest possible re-
turn to latrine investment. This increased return to building a latrine will, on average, raise
latrine ownership; this testable prediction will be evaluated against the data in subsequent
sections. Further, if women are scarce, then some men must remain unmarried. Due to
transferable utility, these men can bid away the entire marital surplus that low sanitation
level men would have obtained if there were equal numbers of men and women. Thus,
married males with low sanitation level receive no surplus, and so the marital return for
sanitation investment is larger than in the case of equal male and female populations. In-
vesting in a latrine will, except in extreme cases of sex imbalance, ensure men marry at least
a low sanitation class woman. In contrast, if women are abundant, then some women must
remain unmarried and men with a low sanitation level receive the entire surplus associated
with marrying a woman of low sanitation level. Their incentives to invest in sanitation are
consequently diminished as compared to the equal populations or scarce women cases.
As discussed above, dowries are a common feature of marriage markets in this empirical
context. If women (or their families) can simply adjust the dowry amount depending on
their sanitation class, how would the predictions from Proposition 1 be affected? The second
proposition provides an answer to this question and clarifies that, in the transferable utility
framework studied here, dowries have no impact on the predictions from Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. If dowry amount is independent of spousal characteristics, then premarital invest-
ment decisions are fully separable from decisions over dowry amount. If dowry depends on spousal
traits, then dowry amount is determined in equilibrium as one component of the marital surplus.
Dowry thus has no effect on male premarital investment.
Proof. See Section A.4 in the appendix.
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This result confirms that dowries are fully internalized in the transferable utility frame-
work, and thus do not impact the empirical predictions from the model. Whereas in later
sections I confirm the predictions from Proposition 1, I am unable, given data limitations,
to test empirically whether dowry adjusts as a response to the “No Toilet, No Bride” cam-
paign.9 Later in the discussion of my empirical results, I present limited evidence on changes
in dowry as a result of the program.
4 Empirical Context
4.1 Overview of the Empirical Argument
To examine the predictions presented in Section 3, I develop an empirical strategy that takes
advantage of a natural policy experiment in the Indian state of Haryana. In 2005, Haryana
authorities decided to implement a state-level messaging campaign, which was inspired by
the work of a local NGO, that linked potential brides’ bargaining power over marriage with
the state’s low levels of sanitation. Women and their families were encouraged to demand
from potential suitors a latrine prior to marriage. In this way the campaign created a new
link between long-standing customs related to arranged marital negotiations and one par-
ticular good that women value.
The empirical argument proceeds in the following steps. I first explain why latrines
are much more valuable to women than men, i.e. why they can be considered a type of
female good. The second step discusses the sanitation campaign known as “No Toilet, No
Bride” (henceforth, NTNB) and explains its primary effects in terms of the theory outlined
above. By focusing on women’s ability to demand latrines, the program provides a means
of studying their bargaining power on the marriage market. Subsequently, I show evidence
that the policy has indeed caused an increase in latrine ownership, that this effect is mediated
by the marriage market, and that sex ratios appear to be driving the program effect, further
supporting the predictions of the marriage market model. Finally, I present complementary
evidence that the program appears not to have changed male preferences as opposed to
female preferences, and evidence that the program caused an increase in latrine ownership
only through the marriage market.
9In the context of Bangladesh, however, Arunachalam & Naidu (2006) find that dowries adjust to antici-
pated changes in bargaining over fertility. Although this is a different setting, it does provide some of the only
evidence available that expected bargaining can impact premarital behavior.
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4.2 Sanitation, Gender, and the “No Toilet, No Bride” Program
4.2.1 Sanitation as a Female Good
In rural India, a large majority of people lack access to sanitation and must defecate in the
open. In a recent household survey conducted in Madhya Pradesh, for example, 80% of re-
spondents reported that their primary places of defecation were fields, bushes, rivers/streams,
and other public spaces rather than an improved latrine (Patil & Salvatore (2010)). Access to
sanitation, and the lack thereof, affects all people but is of particular significance to women.
It is, first of all, a matter of convenience to have a private toilet at home, to be used at one’s
whim with little effort; this value exists for all members of the household. For women, how-
ever, private latrines also provide significant benefits in terms of personal dignity and phys-
ical security. The impact of sanitation on female dignity is reflected well in the comments of
a sixteen-year-old girl, who explained that “the toilet campaign is like a liberation. . . I would
feel so conscious and ashamed [setting off in the mornings toward the open fields]. But
just before my brother got married, we got a toilet in the house."10 To mitigate embarrass-
ment, Indian women often relieve themselves before sunrise or after dark, putting them at
greater risk of sexual assault and other attacks from either humans or, in many rural areas,
dangerous wild animals.11
These strong preferences for privacy result in uncomfortable strategies to minimize ex-
posure. It is common for women to refrain from drinking during the day in order to avoid
needing to use a toilet before sunset. Another respondent elaborated on this behavior: “You
can spot men all over the hills and in the main town parking themselves on the side of the
roads. But when we go down. . . we keep in mind that we shouldn’t consume too much
liquids, or else we might have to use the dirty loos. We have got used to holding it for-
ever.” These coping mechanisms have psychological and physical consequences. “Women
suffer the most [from lack of sanitation] since there are prying eyes everywhere”, said Ashok
Gera, a doctor who works in a one-room clinic in Haryana. “It’s humiliating, harrowing and
extremely unhealthy. I see so many young women who have prolonged urinary tract infec-
tions and kidney and liver problems because they don’t have a safe place to go”. Despite
these health effects, women rarely report health concerns as a motivation for toilets; their
rationales are most frequently framed in terms of privacy and dignity. This is evidence of a
strong female preference for privacy in a social context characterized by routine male efforts
to view any uncovered women. Finally, menstruation provides another significant reason
for why women value private latrines: toilets provide females with the privacy, time, and
10Source: Tehelka Magazine (Indian weekly), Vol. 7, Issue 29, July 24, 2010.
11One respondent explained: “During the monsoons it is worse. In the dark when we visit the water logged
field overgrown with grass and floating with night soil, the danger of getting bitten by snakes and scorpions
is also high.” Source: Lesley D. Biswas, The Women’s International Perspective, October 1, 2010.
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comfort necessary to attend to personal hygiene (World Bank (2005)).12 Thus, because of the
high and gender-specific value that women ascribe, latrines can be understood as a type of
private female good.
4.2.2 The “No Toilet, No Bride” Program
In Haryana state, local authorities initiated a massive media campaign in 2005 organized
around the message of respecting the right of women to use latrines in privacy and security.
This campaign is part of India’s Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC), a national initiative of the
Government of India whose primary objective is to ensure access to and use of sanitation
facilities in rural areas. Although a federal initiative, states shoulder a portion of the costs
and have substantial flexibility in local design and implementation.
This information campaign encouraged the families of women to demand of boys’ fam-
ilies that they construct a latrine prior to the woman marrying and relocating into the boys’
family compound (Haryana, like the rest of northern India is predominantly patrilocal). Slo-
gans such as “no loo, no I do" and “no toilet, no bride" were disseminated via radio, banners,
and other advertising channels. In particular, village walls were painted with the message:
“I won’t allow my daughter to marry into a home without toilets.” This initiative thus em-
phasized a novel linkage between social norms around the marriage market and access to
sanitation.
Popular media reports suggest widespread exposure to these ideas.13 In an interview
conducted by the Washington Post, a young male, age 22, who was hoping to marry soon,
explained: “I will have to work hard to afford a toilet. We won’t get any bride if we don’t
have one now.” “I won’t be offended when the woman I like asks for a toilet,” he added. As
part of the information and education campaign, blank building walls were converted into
billboards and painted with the slogan (in Hindi): “I won’t get my daughter married into
a household which does not have a toilet”. A recurring radio jingle sang a tune with the
lyrics: “no loo, no I do.” The founder of Sulabh International, an NGO that designs low-cost
improved latrines, states: “The ‘No Toilet, No Bride’ program is a bloodless coup. When I
started, it was a cultural taboo to even talk about toilets. Now it’s changing. My mother
used to wake up at 4am to find someplace [in the fields or rivers] to go quietly. My wife
wakes up at 7am and can go safely in her home.” These vignettes help to characterize the
social context in which the “No Toilet, No Bride” campaign operates.
12Many authors have argued this strong preference might drive absenteeism among girls in secondary
school, despite the null findings of Oster & Thornton (2011), who do not report on the presence of sanitation
facilities in their sample schools in Nepal and/or whether latrines influence take-up of menstrual cups.
13See, e.g., The Times (UK): “Show us your loo before you woo, men are told” (March 26, 2009) and the
Washington Post: “In India, more women demand toilets before marriage” (October 12, 2009).
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In addition to anecdotal evidence, administrative data from the Haryana health depart-
ment suggest a large increase in latrine ownership in recent years. According to state offi-
cials, 1.42 million toilets were built between 2005 and 2009. Among this total, 950,000 latrines
were built by families above the poverty line and 470,000 by households below the poverty
line. Further, household survey data provides additional support for the claim of increased
latrine coverage. According to data from two rounds of the District-Level and Household
Survey (these data will be described in greater detail below), the proportion of households
that owned improved latrines increased from 29% in 2004 to 41% in 2008.
Note that latrines are moderately costly capital investments. The average cost of an im-
proved latrine (e.g. a pit latrine with protective slab or a flush toilet to septic tank) typi-
cally ranges between 1000 and 2000 rupees (approximately $20–40 USD). For purposes of
comparison, Haryana’s state-mandated minimum wage for “Scheduled Appointments” of
unskilled laborers was 135 rupees in 2004. According to the Indian NSS, Haryana has the
second highest daily wage rate for agricultural labor (195 rupees). Therefore, the cost of
typical latrine will range from five to 14 days of paid labor for these two unskilled groups.
However, the Government of India provides through the Total Sanitation Campaign subsi-
dies that reimburse households for up to 80% of latrine costs if they possess a Below Poverty
Line (BPL) card. Given this incentive scheme, households below the poverty line (BPL) are
able to construct an improved latrine at an actual cost of approximately Rs. 200–300 (roughly
$4.50–6.75 USD). This amount would be only two days labor for an unskilled worker at
Haryana’s public position minimum wage or for an agricultural daily wage laborers with
BPL card (NSS 2010).
5 Empirical Strategy
Haryana’s “No Toilet, No Bride” campaign can be understood as generating exogenous vari-
ation in the proportion of women with strong preferences for sanitation. Thus, by studying
how latrine adoption responds to the program, it is possible to test empirically the predic-
tions from the theoretical model.
I identify program effects by exploiting the following intuition. The program is targeted
to girls and their families in the sense that the female side of the marriage market must ac-
cept the campaign’s message and decide to take action. The female side of the market is the
first step in the sequence of behavioral change related to latrine ownership. However, if the
program is effective and women either express their preference or demand a latrine from
potential suitors, then the program will exert disproportionate pressure, which is plausibly
exogenous, specifically on those households that have boys of marriage age, i.e. households
with boys active or nearly active on the marriage market. To study whether women are able
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to demand and obtain latrines, therefore, I explore changes in latrine ownership among these
particular households with marriageable boys, who comprise the actual treatment group in
which the relevant outcome can be measured. After exposure to the program, households
with boys of marriageable age can be expected to have a higher probability of latrine adop-
tion as compared with households without marriageable boys.
Since the campaign began in 2005, households are unable to choose the number of mar-
riageable boys as a response to program incentives.14 In this sense, program exposure in
Haryana is plausibly exogenous to the presence of a marriageable boy. Still, households
with marriageable boys might differ systematically from non-marriageable boy households,
which raises concerns about endogeneity in any simple comparison of these two groups
over time.
To address these econometric concerns, I propose two complementary analyses. Estima-
tion begins with a difference-in-difference (DD) specification, which controls explicitly for
potential differences in marriageable boy and non-marriageable boy households. I lay out
the identifying assumptions required for this analysis, discuss unresolved issues, and pro-
pose an additional method based on significantly weaker assumptions. In particular, I use a
difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) specification, which captures the change in the
difference between households with and without marriageable boys on ownership of a la-
trine after the program was implemented, using northern Indian states other than Haryana
as a comparison group. As discussed in Section 2, these states are an appropriate choice for
comparison with Haryana because of their relative similarity on matters of son preference
and sex ratios as compared to southern Indian or the easternmost Indian states. For these
reasons, the factors that mediate women’s bargaining power and marriage market processes
are likely to be comparable across treatment and comparison households. Estimates of the
NTNB program effect are shown to be consistent and similar in magnitude across the DD
and DDD specifications, despite being based on different assumptions.
5.1 Data
This paper uses two rounds of household microdata from the District Level Household and
Facility Survey (DLHS), a nationwide survey implemented by the Government of India to
track the national Reproductive and Child Health Program.15 The primary survey module
interviews a representative sample of ever-married women and gathers household infor-
14Households could choose, of course, how and when to become active on the marriage market. The manner
in which I construct my marriageable boy variable, explained in greater detail in Section 5.2, addresses this
concern explicitly.
15DLHS is an initiative of India’s Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and is implemented by the Interna-
tional Institute for Population Sciences in Mumbai.
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mation on maternal and child health outcomes, family planning and reproductive health,
utilization of health care services, access to health facilities, and health knowledge. Addi-
tional modules focus on household, village, and health facility characteristics, but I do not
use them in my analysis. The data form a repeated cross-section that is representative at the
district level for 601 districts in 34 Indian states and territories. I use the two latest survey
rounds, DLHS-2 (2004) and DLHS-3 (2008/9), which provide data immediately preceding
the project period as well as after three/four years of program exposure.16
I restrict the sample to focus on rural households from northern states, which are those
states characterized by the strongest cultural preference for sons, as discussed in Section
2.3.17 Using these restrictions, my 2004 data contains information on roughly 220,000 house-
holds, including 12,500 in Haryana; the 2008 sample contains data on approximately 370,000
households, including about 16,000 Haryana households.
5.2 Variable Construction
In my empirical analysis, I construct the following variables. Latrine is a binary indicator that
assumes the value of one if household i owns a private latrine that prevents contact between
humans and excreta, as per the standard definition of the Joint Monitoring Programme of
WHO and UNICEF; note that shared latrines and pit latrines without slabs do not meet
these criteria. I use this definition due to its operational relevance to governmental and non-
governmental sanitation programs, including the Total Sanitation Campaign and “No Toilet,
No Bride”. Moreover, the requirement that toilets be private to a household is closely related
to women’s concerns around privacy and dignity, and is thus important in the context of the
“No Toilet, No Bride” program.
The marriageable boy and girl variables, mboy and girl, are based on the gender-specific
mean age of marriage +/− one standard deviation (and rounded to the nearest integer).
This variable adopts a value of one for any household that has a boy/girl of marriageable
age, irrespective of marital status. Given my empirical strategy, I am implicitly defining
the “No Toilet, No Bride” treatment group as those households with boys of marriageable
age, the vast majority of which have been active on the marriage market during the pro-
16For the remainder of the paper, I will simply refer the DLHS-3 survey year as 2008.
17The 16 states included in my sample are: Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Chandigarh,
Uttaranchal, Haryana, Delhi, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chhatisgarh,
Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat. My empirical results are robust to alternative sample selection that includes
only Haryana and adjacent states as well as a regional criterion that includes all states in the northwest quad-
rant of the country. However, the policy that I examine in my empirical section is at the state-level. Therefore,
due to matters of inference using clustered data, it is desirable to include the largest number of states that
could serve as plausible controls. Given the close relationship between son preference and women’s outcomes
in society, the most appropriate control group is comprised by those states with similar levels of stated son
preference.
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gram. I considered alternative definitions of the marriageable criterion, including one based
exclusively on single, unmarried children, one based on strictly married men, as well as
one using different intervals around the gender-specific mean. Increasing the interval size
around mean age at marriage is undesirable because it includes larger numbers of house-
holds who might not be affected by treatment. Observe that the definition using singles
excludes by construction any households with marriageable boy(s) who married after the
program began, thereby eliminating from treatment sample exactly those households most
likely to have responded to the program. At the same time, the use of strictly married young
men as mboys would exclude households with marriageable boys who purchased a toilet in
anticipation of marriage.18 My preferred definition, therefore, is the gender-specific mean
age at marriage +/− one standard deviation because it best balances these concerns.
To account for unobserved household fertility preferences, I also construct another mboy-
oriented variable that is the total number of mboys in the household divided by the total
number of living children. This variable provides a more robust test of the effect of mboys
even if there are unobserved changes in household fertility in Haryana, which are potentially
correlated with presence of an mboy. While I report the results from regressions that use this
fraction of mboys variable instead of simply the presence or absence of mboys, it will be seen
that this modified use of mboys does not alter in either a qualitative or quantitative manner
the central findings.
My empirical definition of marriage market builds on the discussion in Section 2, where I
reviewed evidence that (i) nearly all women marry within their caste group, and (ii) nearly
all women move, upon marriage, to villages that are between 30 and 70 kilometers away
from their home villages. Taken together, these facts provide a natural means of defin-
ing a given household’s marriage market. Unfortunately, the DLHS data does not contain
geocoded data on households, nor does it identify previous residences, so I am unable to
define marriage markets in this explicitly spatial way. Instead, I assume marriage occurs
predominantly within one’s administrative district. Districts in India are heterogeneous in
terms of area, but their size ranges are comparable to the ranges reported in the studies of
marriage migration. For example, the largest district in Haryana is roughly 70 kilometers
across from the western to eastern administrative boundary, while the smallest district is
roughly 17 kilometers in diameter. Thus, districts provide a reasonable approximation to
the distance across which marriages typically form.
The second descriptive fact from Section 2 used when defining marriage markets is caste
endogamy, which refers to practice of marrying within one’s own caste group. For the pur-
poses of this marriage institution, the relevant grouping is the jati, which is sometimes re-
18Numerous popular media accounts contain interviews in which young men report they are building a
latrine in preparation for the marriage market, even if a potential spouse is not yet identified.
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ferred to, imprecisely, as sub-caste. The jati is a community that plays the principal role in
providing one’s social identity, including providing potential marital partners, providing
some forms of insurance against consumption risk, and serving as a professional network
across labor markets (Munshi & Rosenzweig (2006)). In the absence of this detailed, jati-
specific data, I use the DLHS question on broad caste grouping. This variable represents an
aggregation of finer social categories, but it still divides the sample population into four cat-
egories (scheduled caste, scheduled tribe, other “backward”, and other).19 Finally, because
the relatively large caste category of “other” might include more than one religion (and mar-
riages almost never happen across religions), I also include religion in my marriage market
definition. Thus, a marriage market for the purposes of this paper will be those households
in household i’s home district with marriageable boys/girls of the same caste grouping and
religion.
Finally, the variable for sex ratio is the ratio of women to men in a particular marriage
market. I exclude households in marriage markets where either the number of marriage-
able boys or girls is less than twenty individuals; this omits unusual and pathological (e.g.
missing) values for the sex ratio. There exists substantial variation in the sex ratios across
marriage markets, despite the overall sex imbalance in the population.
Table I presents summary statistics on key variables for Haryana and comparison states
in each round of the survey. These two groups are comparable across a wide range of rel-
evant observables, including household size, the fraction of households with and without
mboys, male age at marriage, age of the household head, etc. Given the severity of sex imbal-
ance in the Punjab region, which includes Haryana, there is a few percentage point differ-
ence in the ratio of women to men, although the trend in similarly declining (i.e. becoming
more skewed against women) over time in both Haryana and control states. Note that the
sex ratio is greater than one in Haryana in 2004 and in control states in both 2004 and 2008.
There are two reasons why this is the case. First, the marriage market definition internalizes
the average age gap between men and women at the time of marriage. On average, men
marry girls that are 3.5 years younger than them. With population growth, each successive,
younger cohort is larger than its predecessor. Thus, by defining marriageable boys and girls
in this way, the fact of sex imbalance due to son preference is countervailed by the impact of
population growth. The second reason is that the variance of the distribution of female age
at marriage is lower than that for males. Hence, when I define the marriage market in re-
spect to male and female mean ages at marriage +/− one standard deviation, the age range
for males is two years larger for males than females. This additionally causes more males to
be included in a marriage market, thereby increasing the sex ratio.
Latrines are also substantially different across Haryana and comparison states. In data
19These categories encompass 19.4%, 13.3%, 39.9%, and 27% of my sample, respectively.
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from both survey rounds, control states have mean latrine ownership that is nearly 10 per-
centage points lower than in Haryana. One reason for this is that Haryana is wealthier than
most of the states in the comparison group, and wealth is correlated with latrine ownership.
Moreover, the overall trends in latrine ownership in Haryana and control states differ as
well. Observe that in the comparison states sample latrine ownership has actually declined
between 2004 and 2008. For this reason a difference-in-difference analysis that simply com-
pares Haryana and controls over time would be inappropriate. But when I disaggregate
latrine ownership by mboy status, it can be seen the decline in the control group is actually
driven by the non-mboy households; mboy households in this group have increased their la-
trine ownership, on average, but to a lesser degree than in Haryana. In other words, there
is a two percentage point increase in latrines among mboy households in comparison states,
but this increase is much greater in Haryana due to the incentives established by NTNB.
Note that in the DDD framework, which is explained in more detail below, these differential
trends across mboy/non-mboy households are explicitly controlled for, and so pose no threat
to identification.20
5.3 Empirical Specification
To estimate the impact of Haryana’s “No Toilet, No Bride” campaign on improved latrine
ownership, I begin with a difference-in-difference specification that compares latrine own-
ership between Haryana households with and without mboys before and after program ex-
posure. This analysis highlights the core intuition driving the empirical strategy, namely
that NTNB targeted the behavior of mboy households in particular. I run a regression of the
following form:
Latrineit = α+ β1(mboyi × postt) + β2(mboyi) + β3(posti) + eit (7)
where mboy is an indicator variable that adopts the value of one if household i has a male
household member between the ages of 19–27 (males’ mean age at marriage +/− one stan-
dard deviation) and eit is a household-specific iid error term that satisfies E(eit|X) = 0.
Standard errors are clustered at the village-level.
In addition to the primary definition of mboys, I use an alternative mboy variable that is
the fraction of mboys in the household divided by the total number of children. This alternate
definition addresses potential concerns that unobserved household fertility could be corre-
lated with women’s status. This DD specification controls for unobserved time-invariant
traits of mboy and non-mboy households, as well as secular trends in Haryana. The coef-
20As an extra robustness check, I run the entire analysis on a sample of households that excludes any states
that have declining latrine coverage. All estimates remain unchanged.
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ficient of interest β1 is therefore identified from changes in latrine ownership among mboy
households over time. Consistent identification in this case depends on the common trends
assumption for mboy and non-mboy households, i.e. observed changes in latrine ownership
between these two groups of households would have been identical in the absence of the
program.
One concern with this approach, which would invalidate the identifying assumption,
is that an unobserved shock in Haryana is positively correlated with latrine ownership in
mboy households or negatively correlated with latrine ownership in non-mboy households.
For example, since mboy are on average slightly wealthier than non-mboy households, any
economic shock that differentially affects wealthier households could affect latrine owner-
ship as well.
I address this concern about potential endogeneity by using a triple difference (DDD)
regression specification, where the three differences are households with and without mar-
riageable boys, in Haryana and comparison states, before and after (three to four years of)
program exposure. I regress a binary variable for latrine in household i in state j at time t on
a set of interactions and fixed effects:
Latrineijt = α+ β1(mboyi × statej × postt) + β2(mboyi × postt) + β3(mboyi × statej)
+ β4(statej × postt) + β5(mboyi) + β6(haryanai) + β7(posti) + eijt (8)
where mboy is defined as both an indicator and a fraction, as explained above, and eijt is a
household-specific iid error term with E(eijt|X) assumed= 0 given the full set of fixed effects
and interactions X. The fixed effects control for unobserved time-invariant factors at the
state level and time-varying factors across both states. The double interaction terms allow
the relationship between marriageable boys and improved latrines to vary across states and
across time, in addition to capturing state-specific linear time trends.
In this formulation, the primary coefficient of interest is β1 on the triple interaction, which
captures the change in the effect of marriageable boys on latrine adoption in Haryana be-
tween 2004 and 2008 relative to the change in effect of marriageable boys on latrine adoption
in control states between 2004 and 2008. This is the period during which the “No Toilet, No
Bride” campaign likely generated additional social pressure on these households. Because
I condition on state-year fixed effects, mboy-state, and mboy-year interactions, β1 is identi-
fied through Haryana-specific changes over time in differential rates of latrine ownership
between households with and without marriageable boys.
Consistent estimation of this saturated linear probability model requires that E(eijt|X, δjt) =
0, where X is a vector comprised of the mboy variable interacted with state and year dum-
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mies, and δjt reflects state-year fixed effects.21 This assumes that changes in this differential
across states and time are orthogonal to unobserved determinants of latrine ownership.
Standard errors in the DDD regressions are clustered at the state-year level (yielding a
total of 32 clusters). Because I use only two cross-sections, there is no concern about the
serial correlation raised by Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan (2004).
6 Empirical Results
The empirical analysis presented in this section tests the two implications derived from the
model of marriage matching with endogenous investment.
6.1 Marriageable Boys and Household Latrine Adoption
I focus first on the main program effect of “No Toilet, No Bride” on latrine ownership; this
analysis corresponds to the first theoretical prediction from Proposition 1. Recall that be-
cause the program generates plausibly exogenous variation that increases the proportion of
women with a strong preference in toilets, the model predicts that latrine adoption should
rise.
The first test of this prediction uses the DD specification given by (7); estimates are pre-
sented in Table III. The DD estimates suggest that NTNB has increased mboy’s investment
in latrines by between 0.057 and 0.061 percentage points over a baseline mean of 0.27, i.e.
NTNB increased latrine ownership by approximately 22%. When using the mboy fraction
variable that controls for household fertility, which is reported in columns (3) and (4), re-
sults are similar, although the point estimates when including controls is somewhat smaller.
As suggested earlier, however, any changes in mboy households, e.g. wealth shocks,
would violate the identifying assumption in this DD framework and yield inconsistent esti-
mates. Therefore, I turn to the DDD analysis, which relies on significantly weaker assump-
tions than the DD framework. Table II provides an intuitive preview of my main findings
regarding the treatment effect of “No Toilet, No Bride” on households with marriageable
boys. This table contains mean latrine ownership among the eight possible groupings im-
plied by the DDD strategy. For exposition, I compare Haryana only with Punjab, which is
the state most similar in terms of culture and economy. Punjab is, in fact, the ideal control
for Haryana due to their long and common history as part of the greater Punjab region. This
evidence must be considered suggestive; statistical inference is complicated by the fact that
21The linear probability model is particularly appropriate in this context because the fully saturated specifi-
cation implies the conditional expectation function of latrine ownership is linear. Still, I run similar regressions
using probit and logit specifications, which yields nearly identical results.
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policy variation occurs at the state-year level.
For this reason, the preferred DDD analysis includes a much larger sample of states,
which have similar son preferences to Haryana. Table IV presents DDD estimates of the
NTNB campaign on latrine adoption. The primary coefficient of interest is the first triple
interaction, which is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.043). The program increases
latrine ownership by 4.3 percentage points above a baseline mean of 0.28 for Haryana’s mboy
households, i.e. a 15% increase among those households likely to be affected by females
demanding/desiring improved sanitation.
These results support the argument that the more simple difference-in-difference speci-
fications (instead of the full DDD implemented here) would provide inconsistent estimates
of the program effect. For example, Haryana increased state-level latrine ownership at a
faster rate than control states, violating the common trends assumption in a DD framework.
Moreover, mboy households in Haryana have, on average, a 3% lower probability of latrine
ownership, which again suggests a DD analysis at the Haryana/control level is problematic.
These changes are explicitly controlled for as part of my identification strategy, as discussed
above.
The key result from this specification is the marked shift in the effect of marriageable
boys on improved latrines, specific to Haryana after the NTNB campaign. Specifically, there
was a 4.3 percentage point change in the differential over time between Haryana and control
households with and without marriageable boys. Because the program targeted specifically
those households whose boys are on the marriage market, and having a marriageable boy
is plausibly exogenous to household decisions regarding improved latrines, conditional on
the full set of interactions and fixed effects, these results provide evidence that either (i)
a positive fraction of marriageable women in Haryana have shifted their preferences and
pressured men into sanitation investments, or (ii) men have anticipated this pressure and
responded by increasing their premarital investment in latrines. There is an additional pos-
sibility, outside of the bargaining interpretation, which suggests that new couples invest in
latrines as a form of health-seeking behavior and health investment in children.22 While the
DDD specification cannot rule out this possibility, the following sections present evidence
on each of these channels and confirm that the marriage market hypothesis is driving these
results.
22This hypothesis of unitary household preferences for investment in children is ruled out by the analysis of
sex ratios below. If women favor child investments more than men, however, then Haryana women demand-
ing toilets, and therefore program effects, could be explained more by child health than private female benefits.
This interpretation is fully consistent with the bargaining interpretation of the empirical results.
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6.2 Marriage Markets, Female Preferences and Latrine Adoption
The second testable prediction from the model states that the impact of rising proportions
of women with a preference for toilets on premarital investment will be mediated by the sex
ratio. To study this cross-partial effect of how sex imbalance in the marriage market mediates
male investment responses to changing female preferences, I use regression specification
(8) in two subsamples, where one is comprised of households in marriage markets with
an oversupply of women and one with an undersupply of women. This formulation is
desirable for expositional purposes, but it is equivalent to interacting the sex ratio indicator
(for r greater or less than unity) with the set of interactions and fixed effects from (8). As
before, I first present estimates from the DD (using mboy/non-mboy and pre/post treatment)
and then turn to the preferred DDD analysis.
Tables V and VI report estimates from these analyses. When women are abundant, the
estimated average treatment effect of NTNB is statistically indistinguishable from zero. By
contrast, when woman are scarce and the marriage market is highly competitive for men, the
treatment effect is nearly double the estimate from the entire sample; this point estimate is
large and highly statistically significant (at the 99 percent level). The difference in magnitude
is nearly double the estimated effect from Table IV, which is consistent with the relative sizes
of the subsamples, these results, and the earlier estimate that ignored the sex ratio.
These results provide strong evidence that skewed sex ratios mediate the impact of
women’s ability to demand latrines on the marriage market. When women are scarce, they
are able to negotiate successfully for latrines, but when they are abundant, men have less in-
centive to invest and women are unable to obtain latrines to the same degree. In this sense,
the phenomenon of missing women in a marriage market appears to have increased female
bargaining power, conditional on survival to marriage age. Finally, these results lend ad-
ditional support to the marriage market hypothesis because evidence of marriage market-
driven latrine adoption bolsters the case that NTNB exerted disproportionate pressure on
marriageable boys.
One issue that arises when interpreting these results is the role of migration. Perhaps
males elect to move out of tight marriage markets with dim prospects, or alternatively, they
import brides from other marriage markets. Similarly, males could seek brides from younger
cohorts, which will be larger than older cohorts, on average, because of population growth.
There are in fact a wide variety of possible means by which men could relax the constraints
imposed on them in a particular marriage market. Unfortunately, the DLHS data do not
contain information that allows me to identify such migration. To the extent men are able
to alleviate the pressure they experience on the marriage market, however, my estimates of
the program effect will underestimate the program effect in the absence of migration across
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marriage markets.
6.3 Investigating Competing Hypotheses
The previous sections provided a series of results that together provide compelling evidence
that male premarital investments respond to both changing distributions of preferences in
the female populations and constraints generated by local sex imbalances.
6.3.1 Identification
In assessing the validity of this identification strategy, note that the most likely explana-
tions for a positive effect of marriageable boys on latrine ownership can be ruled out by this
empirical specification. For example, ifhouseholds with young male adults typically enjoy
higher income, which allows them to purchase latrines, we would expect to see a positive
correlation between marriageable boy households and latrine ownership across both states,
but we would not expect a Haryana-specific change over time. Another rationale for an ob-
served positive correlation between marriageable boy households and latrine ownership is
that transfers associated with marriage, such as dowry and gift-giving, could also facilitate
latrine ownership. A similar counterargument, however, can also rule out this hypothesis:
we would expect this story to affect households with marriageable boys equally in Haryana
and control states.
For the identifying assumption to be invalid, an unobserved factor must cause the trend
in the difference in latrine ownership between households with and without marriageable
boys to diverge across Haryana and control states. In such a case, this factor would cause
the common trends assumption to be violated, i.e. the trend in the differential between
mboy/non-mboy households would inaccurately reflect the counterfactual scenario in Haryana
in the absence of the program. This identifying assumption would be violated if there are
unobserved Haryana-specific shocks that covary with latrine adoption and the presence of a
marriage age boy. This assumption is impossible to accept with certainty, but it is difficult to
generate hypotheses on the types of shocks on Haryana’s marriageable boy households that
would undermine identification.
In this section I consider three competing interpretations of my main results. The first
two hypotheses explore distinct mechanisms by which the observed changes in latrine own-
ership might arise, which are outside the marriage market considerations reflected in the
theoretical framework. The third hypothesis is a placebo test that examines whether any
unobserved factors related to household size and/or fertility are driving my results. Given
the tests conducted here, I can strongly reject each of these competing hypotheses regarding
the NTNB effect.
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6.3.2 Does the Program Change Male Preferences?
Depending on how NTNB messages are received by men, the main empirical result from
Section 6.1 could arise not because women are exerting pressure via the marriage market on
male investments, but because men’s preferences have changed in response to the program.
Consider a scenario whereby NTNB changed young adult male preferences for sanitation
among both households with boys active on the marriage market as well as those with rela-
tively recent experience on the marriage market. Perhaps the program raised the salience of
sanitation in Haryana, changed men’s preferences, and thereby caused an increase in latrine
adoption. In this way households with young men, which are relatively wealthy, became
convinced about the value of sanitation and made the sanitation investment.23 Then even in
my triple difference empirical framework it might be possible to observe a program effect,
yet this hypothesized shift would operate entirely outside of the marriage market.
I test this hypothesis directly by studying whether NTNB has caused any change in la-
trine adoption among households with men slightly older than marriageable age. Recall
that my definition of marriageable boy is +/− one standard deviation from males’ mean
age at marriage; this yields an age range of 19 to 27. Here I create a new indicator that takes
the value of one if a household has anyone in the age range 27 to 34 years. This age group is
young and close enough in age to serve as a reasonable comparison group to very late teens
and twenty-something year olds, but due to their age are almost certainly married already
and therefore immune from marriage market pressures generated by the program. I run a
regression using the same DDD specification as above, but substitute the oldboy variable for
the mboy variable in all interactions and fixed effects.
As can be seen in Table VIII, the main coefficient of interest is statistically zero. These
households, like mboy households, are more wealthy on average than households without
these oldboys. Given the focus on a cohort of men who are otherwise likely to be very sim-
ilar to younger men active on the marriage market (if anything, they should have more
income/wealth, on average, which they could use to purchase a latrine), the null result
suggests that male preferences have not changed as a result of the NTNB program. This
provides additional evidence that the mechanism through which the program operates is
the marriage market hypothesis.
6.3.3 Do Changing Female Preferences Drive Latrine Adoption Outside of Marriage?
A second possibility regarding the behavioral mechanism driving latrine adoption is that
female preferences are indeed changing as a result of NTNB, but that these preferences af-
fect latrine ownership outside of marriage market channels. For example, girls might learn
23Wealth and mboys are correlated in my sample (ρ = 0.11).
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from the NTNB emphasis that latrines are valuable and subsequently push their parents or
husbands into buying them. Under this hypothesis, women still push for latrines as a result
of the program but they obtain the goods for reasons that have nothing to do with marriage
per se.
To study this issue, I use a DDD regression that focuses on mgirls in place of mboys. Yet
many households with both mboys and mgirls will be married, so running this analysis on
the entire sample will include all those households in which men built a latrine in order to
marry. In this case it would be impossible to distinguish between the effects of premarital
bargaining and investment on the one hand and changes in female preferences outside of
the marriage market. Instead, I focus on a subsample that excludes households with both
marriageable boys and marriageable girls. Some of these households will have both mboys
and mgirls because they are siblings; it is unfortunate that they are excluded but the data
does not allow me to differentiate perfectly between sibling pairs and married pairs. The
benefit of analyzing this subsample, however, is that it excludes with near certainty those
couples who married since NTNB began, thereby focusing the analysis on single mgirls.
Table IX reports the results from this analysis. In this case, the coefficient of interest is
again statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that among girls who are active
on the marriage market, and who are thus a primary target of the NTNB message, there is
no program-induced ability to obtain latrines. These results provides an instructive coun-
terpoint to the results from Table IV. In that case, women are able to obtain latrines through
marriage, in accordance with their preferences. But when these marriages are excluded
from the sample, we observe no program effect at all. Therefore, the evidence indicates that
NTNB causes women’s preferences to shift, but that this causes a shift in male premarital
investments only through marriage market pressures.
6.3.4 Omitted Variables Correlated With Household Size
Earlier I noted that the key identifying assumption underlying my econometric specification
could be violated if there exists an unobserved, differential trend that affected only mar-
riageable boy households in Haryana. For example, if Haryana instituted an anti-poverty
program between 2005 and 2008, which raised incomes of marriageable boy households,
then increased toilet coverage could be explained by an income rather than marriage market
effect associated with the program. If this were the case, E(eijt|X, δjt) 6= 0 and estimates of
β1 from eq. (8) would be biased.
Household structure might play a particularly important role in this context because of
the strong son preference in the greater Punjab region. One form this son preference can
take is fertility behavior that follows a stopping rule, i.e. when families have children until
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they have a boy, who will continue to live in the family compound and care for the parents
in old age (girls will typically marry and move away from the village). If households prac-
tice a stopping rule, then households with any girl children will be, on average, larger and
slightly older than households without girls. This reasoning suggests that the demographic
and age structure of the household might vary systematically with the gender composi-
tion of the children. Additionally, because household size is correlated with poverty, any
Haryana-specific anti-poverty program after 2005, such as (hypothetically) workfare or low-
income educational stipends, could also cause a spurious correlation between marriageable
boy households in Haryana in 2008 and latrine ownership.
My alternative definition of mboy as the fraction of mboys among total children in the
household provides on strong test of the influence of unobserved fertility on latrine adop-
tion. In addition, I test the validity of this hypothesis by modifying eq. (8) by adding the full
suite of interactions and fixed effects for two different categories of household size. Specif-
ically, I create a dummy variable for small households that indicates whether the household
is smaller than the mean household size in the sample; large households are those larger than
mean household size. My main empirical specification, modified in this manner, tests simul-
taneously for both potentially confounding stories just outlined.
As can be seen in Table VII, the primary coefficients of interest are, as before, only the
triple interaction terms that reflect the DDD for marriageable boys, small households, and
large households in Haryana in the post-treatment period. I find small and statistically in-
significant effects for both small and large households, and the estimate of the NTNB treat-
ment effect, captured in the mboy triple interaction, remains positive and significant at the
five percent level. These robustness results provide evidence rebutting the notion that fac-
tors related to the age or demographic structure of households are confounding my esti-
mates of the program effect.
7 Bargaining Power and the Intrahousehold Allocation
The theoretical literature on collective household and marriage models suggests that mar-
riage market conditions, such as sex imbalance or divorce laws, should affect the intrahouse-
hold allocation by shifting the resource sharing rule toward the scarcer sex. Thus, theoret-
ical investigations predict that female scarcity should result in greater bargaining power
among the remaining women. In this sense, sex ratios are a prototypical distribution fac-
tor (Browning & Chiappori (1998)), i.e. a condition that alters the household sharing rule
without changing the joint budget set or individual preferences.
Until now, this paper has focused on how marriage market conditions affect male invest-
ments in a good women value highly. I presented evidence that the program appears to
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operate by changing female preferences in conjunction with marriage market pressures re-
lated to sex imbalance. But these results are consistent with two possible mechanisms, both
of which operate through the marriage market. Does the program indeed cause a shift in
female preferences for sanitation, making them stronger than before? Or does the program’s
emphasis on female bargaining power on the marriage market actually increase that power
directly? In other words, the program might shift the distribution of female types and, by so
doing, drive male premarital investment, or it might act as a sort of distribution factor that
itself shifts the intrahousehold sharing rule.
It is less plausible that an information campaign can act in a distribution factor than serve
to shift preferences. Yet these two mechanisms carry strong implications for how household
behavior responds to the program. In particular, the former interpretation suggests the pro-
gram taps into the relative bargaining power held by women when they are scarce, changes
women’s preferences over the bundle of assets and qualities of marriage that they bargain
over, and so causes women to negotiate more readily over latrines as compared to other de-
sired goods. If this interpretation is correct, then we would expect to see that the observed
treatment effect on latrines results in a form of compensating differential with respect to
other goods, i.e. women must trade off some good(s) in order to obtain a toilet at the time of
marriage. And the second interpretation is that by highlighting women’s right to demand
certain goods, particularly if not only in the context of female scarcity, the program provides
an exogenous, positive shock directly to women’s bargaining power rather than to female
preferences. In this case, we would expect to see an unconditional increase in latrines as a
net gain for women, i.e. without any tradeoffs.
I examine the first interpretation that the program changed female preferences, redis-
tributing relatively more weight to latrines and less weight to other items in the bundle of
goods that women value. Greater latrine ownership in response to the program should oc-
cur when women have sufficient bargaining power to obtain goods they particularly desire.
Moreover, if the program causes an alteration of the woman’s weighting scheme over her
preferred goods, then the program effect should also cause a decline in ownership of some
other favored good. We should therefore find evidence that women must trade off some
goods they prefer in order to secure latrines during the marriage bargaining process.
Note that if one is prepared to assume that women would never agree to a trade (of a
latrine for some other good or bundle thereof) that lowered her utility, then one can im-
mediately conclude that the increase in latrine adoption reflects a shift in the intrahousehold
allocation toward women that has unambiguously improved female welfare. Absent this as-
sumption, it is possible to explore a range of household goods and characteristics for which
we have reason to believe women have a strong preference. Given the cultural context of
Haryana, such marriage qualities might include the educational levels of one’s spouse (con-
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ditional on own education), the age gap between husband and wife (younger brides relative
to men are associated with lower status of women in the household; see, e.g., Desai & An-
drist (2010)), influence over fertility, and/or increased access to household assets such as
improved cooking fuels, sewing machines, washing machines, etc.
I test for program effects for each of these outcomes using the DDD approach, when there
is data on the particular asset or outcome for both survey rounds, or using DD (with the dif-
ferences being mboy/non-mboy households in Haryana and control states), when there exists
data only from the 2008 round. Table X summarizes the findings from these regressions. The
unifying result is that along a range of numerous possible goods and desirable traits, there
is no evidence that women have been forced to tradeoff other desirable goods in order to
secure a latrine.
In contrast, these results provide suggestive evidence that the relative position of women
has improved, in addition to latrines, along two key dimensions: the education level of the
husband, conditional on women’s education, and the age at marriage/living with husband.
With respect to the education difference between husband and wife, a simple analysis of
the DDD estimates does not yield statistically significant differences. Disaggregating the
data into those households with and without latrines, however, indicates an increase in 0.1
years in the differential between male and female schooling specifically among mboy house-
holds in Haryana post-treatment; in these same households without latrines, there appears
to have been a 0.03 year decline in the gap but this is not statistically significant; the statis-
tically significant difference between these estimates is 0.13 years. The evidence therefore
suggests a slight improvement in the average quality of males for a given female only in
those treatment households with latrines.
With respect to female age at marriage, a trait which is positively associated with female
status, a pattern similar to the education gap emerges. That is, the DD estimate of changes
in age at marriage that arise among mboy households in Haryana is not statistically signifi-
cant, but it appears to mask heterogeneity across households with and without latrines. In
particular, there appears to be an increase of 0.16 years in the mean age at marriage, which
is specific to households that have latrines who are therefore likely to have responded to the
program. In mboy households without latrines, however, no such evidence emerges. Hence,
women in mboy households in Haryana after treatment appear to get married slightly later
(0.24 years) in those households that have latrines as compared to Haryana mboy households
without latrines. A similar result was found with respect to the age at which the female first
cohabits with the husband.
One interesting result to emerge is that there has been an increase in motorbike own-
ership. Motorbikes are a good that males value and that form a common part of dowry
among wealthier families. The observed increase among mboy households in Haryana after
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program exposure occurs for both mboy households that have latrines as well as those that
do not, but those with latrines have a (statistically significant) two percentage point higher
probability of motorbike ownership than households without latrines after the program.
This quantity reflects a 7% increase in motorbike ownership associated with being a treat-
ment household and having a latrine. This result provides suggestive evidence that marriage
negotiations over toilets have been associated with men being compensated in other ways
for the expense.
Taken together, these suggestive results indicate that NTNB and bargaining over latrines
might have caused a number of shifts in dowry outcomes, but there is no evidence that fe-
males were forced to substitute items they care about in favor of toilets. On the contrary, it
appears that women have improved their relative position in the household on account of
marrying older and marrying better educated men, while Haryana’s mboys have increased
their ownership of motorbikes, especially if they built a latrine. Dowries, which are unob-
served, could play a fundamental role in driving these findings. It seems likely that several
items commonly involved in dowry and marriage negotiations might have shifted in re-
sponse to the program, but without additional data and assumptions on the household’s
behavior it is impossible to empirically determine a shift in the intrahousehold allocation.
8 Conclusion
This paper focuses on an innovative natural policy experiment known as “No Toilet, No
Bride”, which highlighted the link between latrines, for which women have a strong pref-
erence due to concerns about privacy and security, and marriage markets in Haryana state
in the historical Punjab region. Because the program encouraged girls’ families to demand
from boys’ families a latrine prior to marriage, it generated disproportionate pressure to con-
struct a latrine specifically among those households whose boys were of marriageable age
and seeking a bride. I demonstrate that marriageable boy households were indeed affected
disproportionately by the program, and I estimate the “No Toilet, No Bride” treatment effect
to have increased latrine ownership by 15% over the baseline mean of Haryana households
with marriageable boys in 2004. In addition, estimates of latrine adoption in Haryana post-
treatment are four times larger in marriage markets characterized by a scarcity of women as
compared to marriage markets with more women than men.
These results are shown to be invulnerable to competing hypotheses that challenge this
marriageable boy effect of the program. In particular, I have shown (i) there is no evidence
that unobserved factors correlated with household size are driving my estimates and (ii)
the program does not appear to have changed male preferences for latrines. The “No Toi-
let, No Bride” program thus appears to have caused a significant increase in latrine own-
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ership in Haryana specifically through the channel of female preferences in the context of
bargaining power. Moreover, I provide substantial evidence that women are not trading
toilets for other goods in the context of marriage bargaining toilets. Indeed, the program
is associated with an increase along two fundamental dimension for women’s status: the
mean age at marriage and educational quality of the husband. These findings are consistent
with a theoretical framework in which sex imbalance alters marriage market conditions and
causes males to increase their premarital investments in their own quality. The underlying
mechanism that drives latrine adoption among households with marriageable boys is thus
competition on the marriage market and a household’s desire to marry successfully its boys.
In exploring the impact of skewed sex ratios on women’s bargaining power, as reflected
in female demand for latrines under “No Toilet, No Bride”, this paper provides evidence
that, despite widespread and persistent discrimination, the female bargaining position has
improved through heightened competition on the male side of the market.
In addition to the literature on female bargaining power and marriage, this paper also
makes an important contribution to the limited evidence that exists on the effectiveness of
sanitation campaigns at large scale. In India, nearly 70% of the rural population lacks ac-
cess to sanitation, and this situation is associated with severe morbidity and mortality. An
estimated 1.2 million children under five die each year in the country; most of these deaths
are attributed to diarrheal disease and acute respiratory infections, which are both exacer-
bated by inadequate sanitary behavior and sanitation infrastructure (Black, Morris & Bryce
(2003)). In this critical policy context, a low-intensity information campaign, “No Toilet, No
Bride”, cleverly exploited deeply rooted social norms and marriage market conditions in
order to increase sanitation. As a result, there are approximately 500,000 more toilets among
Haryana’s four million households in 2008 than in 2004.24 By studying this large shift, this
paper is informative not only about female bargaining power, but also regarding the design
of sanitation policy and behavior change programs more generally.
Finally, this paper provides, to the best of my knowledge, the first empirical evidence
on how intrahousehold decision-making affects public good provision. By showing that
female bargaining power determines women’s ability to obtain goods (with public good
characterictics), this paper highlights a new and important mechanism that impairs socially
optimal provision of certain key goods.
24This number reflects the increase in toilets in Haryana that can be attributed to the “No Toilet, No Bride”
campaign based on estimates in this paper.
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A Theoretical Appendix
A.1 Additional Features of Transferable Utility
The assumption underlying the transferable utility framework is that this marital surplus
is divided and shared between spouses. In particular, the surplus is divided according to a
sharing rule that is determined not by the individual characteristics of partners in a match,
but by the requirements imposed by stable matching. A matching assignment profile is con-
sidered stable if no two married or unmarried people prefer to be together and no married
individual prefers to be single (Gale & Shapley (1962)). This profile will display either pos-
itive or negative assortativeness depending on the super- or sub-modularity of the marital
output function f (x, y), i.e. whether traits x and y are complements or substitutes.25 Then
the key feature of transferable utility is that a man (woman) with a given level of quality can
“bid away” higher quality men (women) by offering the potential spouse on the other side
of the market a greater share of the marital surplus. The well-known consequence is that
the equilibrium, i.e. the stable assignment profile, must maximize aggregate marital surplus
across all men and women (Shapley & Shubik (1972) and Becker (1973)). Moreover, the
sharing rule that specifies the division of the marital surplus is determined in equilibrium
through the requirements of stable matching. In this way, changes in the relative propor-
tions of men and women, or in the distribution of quality in the male or female populations,
alter the sharing rule over marital surplus.
A.2 Further Characterization of Equilibrium
To characterize equilibrium formally, let α denote the fraction of women of high sanitation
class; (1− α) is therefore the fraction of women with low sanitation preferences. Similarly,
define β as the fraction of men who have invested in a latrine and so are of high sanitation
class; (1− β) gives the complementary set of men who did not invest. The second criterion
for equilibrium can then be expressed for each possible scenario outlined above, i.e. α = β,
α > β, and α < β.
The first case, when equal numbers of high sanitation class people get married, is the
following:
α = [1− F(−Ul)]G(φx +Uh −Ul)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Always marry and invest
+
∫ −Ul
−Uh
G(φx +Uh + θ)h(θ)dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Married b/c invested
= β (9)
25This paper assumes throughout that positive assortativeness holds.
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The second and third cases involve the possibility that, in equilibrium, more men or
women belong to the high sanitation class and thus some individual(s) in the high grouping
marry individual(s) from the low grouping. Formally, these cases are:
α > [1− F(−Ul)]G(φx +Uh −Ul) +
∫ −Ul
−Uh
G(φx +Uh + θ)h(θ)dθ (10)
α < [1− F(−Ul)]G(φx +Uh −Ul) +
∫ −Ul
−Uh
G(φx +Uh + θ)h(θ)dθ (11)
Eq. (10) states there are more women with high preferences for sanitation than men who in-
vested in latrines. Eq. (11) considers the opposite case when more men invested than there
are women with high preferences for sanitation. Note that the assumption of complemen-
tarity of types implies that only one of these inequalities can hold at once. These expressions
combined with equation (9) specify the equilibrium. See Chiappori, Iyigun & Weiss (2009)
for a proof of existence and uniqueness of this marriage market equilibrium.
A.3 Division of the Marital Surplus
The equilibrium conditions have strong implications for the sharing rule that divides marital
surplus. Consider each of the three cases in turn. In the first case, when α = β, there is
perfect positive assortativeness. Thus, the surplus from marriage of same types, zhh or zll,
must equal the sum of shares from two same-class individuals marrying, that is:
zhh = Uh +Vh (12)
zll = Ul +Vl (13)
Male and female shares need not be equal if the outside options to marriage differ across
spouses.
When α 6= β, then surplus shares must satisfy:
Uh +Vl ≥ zhl (14)
Ul +Vh ≥ zlh (15)
In particular, when α < β, there are more men who invested than there are women with
strong preferences for sanitation, and eq. (14) will hold with equality while eq. (15) will
hold as a strict inequality. An immediate consequence of these equilibrium shares is that
high sanitation men must relinquish some of the marital return from their investment. In
particular, they must receive their lower-bound marital return to investment; otherwise, an
equivalent man could bid away any surplus until the minimum bound is restored. Plugging
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eq. (14) into (12) and using (13) yields:
Vh −Vl = zhh − zhl (16)
Uh −Ul = zhl − zll (17)
Eq. (17) specifies the marriage market return to investment by males, and men get only their
marginal contribution to a marriage with a low sanitation class woman, i.e. the lower bound
on their investment return. By contrast, women with high sanitation preferences get their
entire contribution to the marital surplus of a marriage with a man with a high sanitation
class. By contrast, when α > β, men receive the entire marginal contribution to marital
surplus from their investment (= zhh − zlh), and women receive the remainder (= zlh − zll).
These bounds on the marriage market returns yield testable results. I gather the key
predictions from this discussion into Proposition 1, which is presented in Section 3.7 above.
Proof. I consider each of the two main testable predictions in turn.
Observe that eq. (9) implicitly defines males’ marriage market return to investment (Uh−
Ul) as a function of α. As α increases, it immediately follows that either Uh must increase
and/or Ul decrease in order for there to be sufficient men willing to marry (conditional on
investing). Thus, an increase in α drives male premarital investment by increasing males’
marriage market return.
For the second implication, consider eq. (6) when θy > −Vh and all women want to marry
someone.26 Assume r < 1 and women are scarce. This implies that some men must remain
unmarried. As r decreases, Vh and Ul must decline and/or Uh must increase, which implies
that the marriage market return to male premarital investment increases (and women’s mar-
riage market return to being of high sanitation class must decline) to maintain equality in
the numbers of men and women who want to marry.
In the case of equal populations, i.e. r = 1, an increase in the fraction of females with
strong preferences for sanitation causes men to receive their upper bound return on sanita-
tion investment. Now consider a situation of female scarcity. Some proportion (1− r) men
will fail to marry, even if they want to, because of an insufficient number of brides. These
potentially unmarried men, who will all be of a low sanitation class, will bid away the entire
surplus obtained by the married low sanitation class men, i.e. Ul decreases. The immediate
consequence is that Uh−Ul is larger than in the case of equal populations. Conversely, when
r > 1 and women outsupply men, then low sanitation level men receive the entire surplus
in a marriage with a low sanitation type female, i.e. Ul increases as compared to the case of
26This situation in which the idiosyncratic gain from marriage for females is sufficiently large to cause all
women to prefer marriage is easily justified given the particularly low status ascribed to older single women
in Haryana.
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equal populations. Therefore, Uh −Ul must be smaller when r > 1 than when r = 1, which
is in turn smaller than when r < 1. In this way, the second part of Proposition 1 follows
directly from transferable utility and the requirements of pairwise stable matching.
A.4 Dowries
In a transferable utility (TU) framework, dowries form a part of the transfers that divide
the surplus. Thus, a natural way to incorporate dowry is to assume that marital output is
comprised of two portions: non-dowry and dowry output, i.e. the marital output= f (x, y)+
dxy and d can depend in any way on x and y. A union generates additional output over
singles’ status both because of complementary traits in household production (from f (x, y)
and because it brings in “additional” resources from the bride’s family. From the perspective
of the bride’s family, dowry enters as a cost that diminishes the total gain of marriage; if
dowries d are greater than the material and emotional gain from marriage, then the marriage
does not occur. The only relevant criterion for males’ investment decision is the marriage
market return to investment and not how that return is constituted by dowry and other non-
dowry marital output. I summarize this argument as Proposition 2, presented in the main
body of this paper.
Proof. Consider two cases: when dowry is independent of spousal traits and when dowry
depends on spousal traits in an undefined manner.
Note first that if dowry amount is independent of spousal traits, investment decisions
are fully separable from dowry considerations. We can rewrite the respective problems as:
UX = maxY [zXY −VY + d] and VY = maxX [zXY −UX − d]. Thus, the share of male surplus
UX is comprised of two parts: a dowry d and non-dowry amount equal to maxY [zXY −VY],
and males’ decisions are simply over the latter (and, of course, whether to marry at all, i.e.
max{UX + θx + d, 0}).
Now consider the case when dowry payments are determined by spousal traits. Let
dXY denote the dowry given by woman of type Y to man of type X. Ignore considerations
of wealth/income or credit constraints. Then we can rewrite eqs. (2) and (3) to explicitly
incorporate dowry:
ux = max{Ux + θx, 0} where Ux = maxy
[
γxy −Vy
]
(18)
vy = max{Vy + θy − dxy, 0} where Vy = maxx
[
γxy −Ux
]
(19)
where γxy = f (x, y) + dxy − f (x, 0) − f (0, y) = zxy + dxy, and zxy on the right-hand side
of the last equality is the same surplus object from the non-dowry analysis. Although the
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dowry and non-dowry portions of marital output are simply added up and shared, consis-
tent with TU, the dowry also enters as an additional term in the decision by the female about
whether to marry at all.
Irrespective of how dowry depends on spousal traits x and y, the surplus shares from
Section A.3 are easily modified to account for the constraints imposed here. In other words,
the sharing rule that divides the marital surplus is still determined in equilibrium, and the
bounds on the sum of marital output plus dowry must hold in the same way as before. Thus,
from the perspective of male incentives to invest, the inclusion of dowry in this modeling
framework is irrelevant.
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B Figures and Tables
FIGURE I: SEX RATIOS ACROSS INDIAN STATES, 2011
Source: Census of India, 2011.
41
TABLE I: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Haryana Control States
VARIABLE 2004 2008 2004 2008
Latrine 0.285 0.395 0.198 0.185
(0.451) (0.489) (0.398) (0.388)
Latrine (w/ mboy) 0.276 0.419 0.196 0.202
(0.447) (0.493) (0.397) (0.401)
Latrine (w/o mboy) 0.293 0.368 0.199 0.173
(0.455) (0.484) (0.399) (0.378)
Marriageable boy 0.456 0.465 0.415 0.415
(0.498) (0.499) (0.493) (0.493)
Marriageable girl 0.450 0.432 0.442 0.419
(0.498) (0.495) (0.497) (0.493)
HH size 6.263 5.984 6.415 6.041
(2.656) (2.527) (2.942) (2.626)
Number of males 3.265 3.102 3.260 3.067
(1.563) (1.477) (1.730) (1.577)
Number of female 2.996 2.883 3.154 2.974
( 1.606) (1.567) (1.768) (1.617)
Age of HH head 43.631 44.452 43.444 43.787
(13.681) (13.480) (13.221) (13.289)
Male age at marriage 22.975 22.507 22.741 22.397
(3.608) (3.485) (4.625) (4.306)
Female age at marriage 19.310 19.330 18.368 18.545
(2.674) (2.335) (3.666) (3.147)
Sex ratio 1.016 0.962 1.087 1.048
(0.091) (0.094) (0.138) (0.144)
Observations 15220 14108 263079 319449
Standard errors in parentheses. Marriageable boys are household members 18–26 in age; mar-
riageable girls are members aged 15–24. Haryana has the “No Toilet, No Bride” campaign, which
started in 2005 and has been ongoing since then.
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TABLE II: MEAN LATRINE OWNERSHIP BY TREATMENT-STATE-YEAR
Before After Time Trend
TREATMENT HHS
Haryana 0.270 0.320 0.050
Punjab 0.522 0.670 0.148
Within Year Diff. −0.152 −0.250
Diff-in-Diff −0.098
NON-TREATMENT HHS
Haryana 0.276 0.276 0.000
Punjab 0.502 0.633 0.131
Within Year Diff. −0.126 −0.257
Diff-in-Diff −0.131
DDD ESTIMATE −0.098+ 0.131 = 0.033
This table summarizes the triple difference strategy (in Haryand and Punjab only) by
looking at group means of latrine ownership using the interaction of treatment group,
state, and time. Treatment households are those with at least one child of marriageable
age, defined as +/− one standard deviation from the gender-specific mean age at
marriage, which are those who should be affected by the NTNB program. Punjab is
the state most similar to Punjab in terms of wealth, culture, and politics.
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TABLE III: LATRINE ADOPTION (DIFF-IN-DIFF ESTIMATES)
Latrine (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mboy x Post 0.061∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012)
Mboy -0.017 -0.041∗∗∗ 0.011 -0.039∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)
Post 0.082∗∗∗ 0.065 0.015 0.039∗∗
(0.026) (0.017) (0.033) (0.019)
Constant 0.276∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.015) (0.034) (0.019)
Controls N Y N Y
R2 0.014 0.251 0.021 0.249
N 29345 27815 29328 27815
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether household i has a la-
trine. Column (1) reports the basic DD regression using the mboy variable. Column
(2) adds the following control variables: age and education of the household head,
wife/mother’s education, household size, and four proxies for wealth (house type,
fan, TV, phone, and motorcycle). Column (3) using the fraction of mboys variable, which
uses total number of mboys in the household as a fraction of total children in order
to account for household fertility. Column (4) adds the same control variables to the
regression from Column (3). The primary coefficient of interest in all cases is the dou-
ble interaction. All standard errors are clustered at the village-year level. Significance
levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1.
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TABLE IV: LATRINE ADOPTION (DDD ESTIMATES)
Latrine (1) (2) (3) (4)
Mboy x Haryana x Post 0.036∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Mboy x Haryana -0.011 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.021∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Mboy x Post 0.019∗ 0.001 0.023∗∗ 0.003
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Haryana x Post 0.110∗∗ 0.051∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(0.046) (0.026) (0.045) (0.025)
Mboy 0.009 -0.013∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Haryana 0.088∗∗∗ -0.064∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.013) (0.024) (0.025)
Post -0.102∗∗ -0.016 -0.101∗∗ -0.016
(0.046) (0.026) (0.045) (0.025)
Constant 0.281∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Controls N Y N Y
R2 0.019 0.330 0.020 0.333
N 445584 445583 393885 393884
The dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether household i has a latrine. Column (1) reports
the basic DDD regression using the mboy variable. Column (2) adds the following control variables: age
and education of the household head, wife/mother’s education, household size, and four proxies for
wealth (house type, fan, TV, phone, and motorcycle). Column (3) using the fraction of mboys variable,
which uses total number of mboys in the household as a fraction of total children in order to account for
household fertility. Column (4) adds the same control variables to the regression from Column (3). The
primary coefficient of interest in all cases is the triple interaction. All standard errors are clustered at
the state-year level. Significance levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1.
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TABLE V: SEX RATIOS & MARRIAGE MARKET COMPETITION (DD ESTIMATES)
LOW SEX RATIO HIGH SEX RATIO
Latrine Ownership Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Mboy x Post 0.075∗∗∗ 0.000 0.020 0.308
(0.014) (0.019)
Mboy -0.022∗ 0.050 0.001 0.906
(0.011) (0.012)
Post 0.133∗∗∗ 0.000 0.034∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.020) (0.013)
Constant 0.241∗∗∗ 0.000 0.348∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.008)
R2 0.034 0.002
N 18399 10568
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether household i owns a latrine. I run this specifica-
tion separately for households in a competitive marriage market (from the marriageable boy’s
perspective), which is defined as having more marriageable boys than marriageable girls, and
for households in a less competitive marriage market. These are the low and high sex ratio
columns, respectively. The coefficients of interest (the double interactions) are statistically dif-
ferent from each other at the 99% level. Standard errors, clustered at the village-year level, are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1
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TABLE VI: SEX RATIOS & MARRIAGE MARKET COMPETITION (DDD ESTIMATES)
LOW SEX RATIO HIGH SEX RATIO
Latrine Ownership Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Mboy x Haryana x Post 0.065∗∗∗ 0.007 0.018∗ 0.061
(0.024) (0.009)
Mboy x Haryana -0.044∗∗ 0.038 -0.018 0.199
(0.021) (0.014)
Mboy x Post 0.005∗ 0.443 0.036∗∗ 0.028
(0.006) (0.015)
Haryana x Post 0.099∗ 0.056 -0.110∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.042) (0.036)
Mboy 0.016∗∗∗ 0.002 0.007 0.611
(0.004) (0.012)
Haryana 0.056 0.226 0.090∗∗ 0.018
(0.046) (0.034)
Post 0.110∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.170∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.021) (0.037)
Constant 0.136∗∗∗ 0.000 0.291∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.010) (0.012)
R2 0.028 0.028
N 249100 270938
The dependent variable is a dummy for whether household i owns a latrine. I run this specifica-
tion separately for households in a competitive marriage market (from the marriageable boy’s
perspective), which is defined as having more marriageable boys than marriageable girls, and
for households in a less competitive marriage market. These are the low and high sex ratio
columns, respectively. The coefficients of interest (the triple interactions) are statistically dif-
ferent from each other at the 99% level. Standard errors, clustered at the state-year level, are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1
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TABLE VII: HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
Improved Latrine Coef. SE p-value
Mboy x Haryana x Post 0.037∗∗ 0.016 0.019
Mboy x Haryana -0.024∗∗ 0.011 0.035
Mboy x Post 0.007 0.011 0.499
Mboy 0.023∗∗∗ 0.007 0.003
Small HH x Haryana x Post 0.024 0.018 0.176
Small HH x Haryana -0.045∗∗∗ 0.016 0.004
Small HH x Post -0.072∗∗∗ 0.020 0.000
Large HH x Haryana x Post -0.002 0.030 0.958
Large HH x Haryana -0.042∗∗∗ 0.016 0.008
Large HH x Post -0.003 0.020 0.888
State-Year FE Yes
R2 0.0645
N 442824
The dependent variable is household latrine ownership. Small HH indicates that
household i had four or less children; large HH indicates household i had more than
four children. Standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. Significance
levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1.
TABLE VIII: “NO TOILET, NO BRIDE” AND MALE PREFERENCES
Latrine Ownership Coef. SE p-value
Oldboy x Haryana x Post 0.003 0.009 0.705
Oldboy x Haryana -0.002 0.010 0.724
Oldboy x Post -0.082∗∗∗ 0.014 0.000
Haryana x Post 0.136∗∗∗ 0.045 0.006
Oldboy 0.100∗∗∗ 0.006 0.000
Haryana 0.075∗∗∗ 0.016 0.000
Post 0.000 0.045 0.996
Constant 0.184∗∗∗ 0.018 0.000
R2 0.010
N 461730
The dependent variable is latrine ownership at the household level. Oldboy is an
indicator variable for whether the household has a male slighter older than be-
ing of marriageable age (i.e. between 28 and 36 years of age). All standard errors
clustered at the state-year level. Significance levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1.
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TABLE IX: FEMALE PREFERENCES OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE
Latrine Ownership Coef. SE p-value
Mgirl x Haryana x Post 0.005 0.011 0.669
Mgirl x Haryana 0.020∗∗∗ 0.006 0.003
Mgirl x Post -0.003 0.111 0.798
Haryana x Post 0.115∗∗ 0.042 0.010
Mgirl 0.022∗∗∗ 0.006 0.001
Haryana 0.079∗∗∗ 0.018 0.000
Post -0.015 0.042 0.724
Constant 0.192∗∗∗ 0.018 0.000
R2 0.007
N 455113
Sample focuses on single mgirls only by excluding households with both
mboys and mgirls. All standard errors clustered at the state-year level. Sig-
nificance levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1.
FIGURE II: MARRIAGE AND INVESTMENT INCENTIVES
θ
c
−Ul-Uh
φx
φx + Uh - Ul
Investment
No marriage
Marry but no investmentNo marriage, no investment
Always marry Never marry
The idiosyncratic gain to marriage, θ, is along the x-axis. Individual costs of investment are along the y-axis. The
yellow region indicates those men who will invest. Graph is adapted from Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss (2009).
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TABLE X: FURTHER EVIDENCE ON INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION
Dep. Var. Full Latrine No Latrine Diff.
Education gap 0.016 0.099∗ -0.032 0.131∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.050) (0.032)
Age gap -0.012 0.026 -0.003 0.029
(0.053) (0.113) (0.956)
Age at first birth 0.208∗∗ 0.105 0.188∗ -0.083
(0.091) (0.078) (0.098)
Pregnant -0.013∗∗ -0.013∗ -0.007 -0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Contraceptive use -0.027∗ -0.002 -0.022 -0.020
(0.014) (0.013) (0.170)
Marriage age -0.042 0.163∗∗∗ -0.079 0.242∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.051) (0.073)
Living with husband 0.145∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.013 0.278∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.049) (0.077)
Sewing machine 0.035∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.008
(0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
Washing machine 0.022∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ -0.006
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Cooker -0.005 -0.003 0.003 0.006
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Fan 0.012 0.003 0.031 -0.028∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Television -0.014∗∗ -0.019 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.004
(0.005) (0.016) (0.007)
Motorcycle 0.052∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.008) (0.018) (0.008)
Reported coefficients are from the triple interaction of mboy-haryana-post. The coefficients for mar-
riage age, age at which first living with husband, washing machine, and cooker are all based on the
difference-in-difference using mboy status and Haryana/control (i.e. with no time dimension) due to
variables being missing from the 2004 round. The first column reports the basic DDD or DD esti-
mates. Column “Diff” reports the statistical significance of the difference between the coefficients from
columns (2) and (3) based on p > χ2. All standard errors are clustered at the state-year level. Signifi-
cance levels: ∗∗∗p< .01 ∗∗p< .05 ∗p< .1.
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